Iran Nuclear Agreement Wikipedia

Republican leaders promised to try to kill the deal as soon as it was released, even before secret sections were made available to Congress, and „Republican lawmakers were running to send press releases criticizing it.“ [295] According to the Washington Post, „most Republicans in Congress remained deeply skeptical, some overtly dismissive, the prospect of lifting economic sanctions, while all Iranian uranium enrichment capabilities remained intact.“ [296] Mitch McConnell said that the agreement „seems to be far behind the goal we all thought we would achieve, that Iran would not be a nuclear state.“ [296] According to a New York Times analysis, Republican opposition to the agreement „seems to have emerged from a genuine aversion to the details of the agreement, an intrinsic distrust of President Obama, an intense loyalty to Israel, and a global vision of the role that sanctions have played beyond the prevention of Iran`s nuclear capabilities.“ [295] The Washington Post identified 12 issues related to the agreement on which both parties disagreed, including the effectiveness of inspections at unreported sites; Effectiveness of snapback sanctions; The importance of the limits of enrichment; The importance of the IAEA`s ancillary agreements; The effectiveness of inspections of military sites; The consequences of leaving an agreement; and the consequences of lifting sanctions. [268] [h] In April 1984, West German intelligence reported that Iran could have an atomic bomb with Pakistani uranium within two years. The Germans leaked this news in the first public report of the Western secret services on a post-revolutionary nuclear weapons program in Iran. [37] Later that year, U.S. Senate minority whip Alan Cranston claimed that the Islamic Republic of Iran was seven years away from building its own nuclear weapon. [38] „President Gerald Ford signed a directive in 1976 that allowed Tehran to purchase and operate a reprocessing plant built in the United States to extract plutonium from nuclear fuel. The agreement was in favour of a comprehensive „nuclear fuel cycle.“ [28] Ford`s strategy paper states that „the introduction of nuclear energy will ensure both the growing needs of the Iranian economy and the remaining oil reserves for export or processing into petrochemicals.“ In an interview with the Financial Times in February 2007, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said military action against Iran would be „catastrophic and counterproductive“ and called for negotiations between the international community and Iran on Iran`s nuclear program. [36] ElBaradei expressly proposed a „double simultaneous suspension, a pause“ as a „confidence-building measure“ that would suspend international sanctions and suspend Iran`s enrichment. [36] ElBaradei also stated: „If I look at it from an arms point of view, there are far more important issues for me than the suspension of enrichment,“ citing its key priorities that prevent Iran from „turning to industrial capacity until the problems are resolved“; Build trust with „full inspection,“ including Iran`s adoption of the additional protocol; and „at all costs“ to prevent Iran from „exiting the [treaty-based non-proliferation system]“.“ [36] February 24, 2012, IAEA Director General Amano told the IAEA Board of Governors that high-level IAEA delegations had met twice with representatives of the Iranian government to intensify efforts to resolve outstanding issues, but that large differences were resolved and that Iran had access to IAEA requests for the Parchin site.

, where the IAEA believes that there may have been highly explosive nuclear weapons research. , was not granted.